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When Policies Make (up for) Politics
A View from Romania
ALEXANDRA IONESCU
Two general perspectives, perfectly congruous, guided the analysis of the 
political change undergone by the former communist countries currently members of 
the European Union: one was focused on the object to be changed, looking for social, 
economic or cultural preconditions of democracy and weighting the inheritance of 
communist and pre-communist experiences; the other was concerned, in a more 
strategic vein, with the subject performing the change, investigating the rationale 
and effects of political choices leading to democratization. It is our contention that 
a perspective envisaging change as a political process or, to be more accurate, as 
a plurality of entrenched political processes, is more fruitful in accounting for the 
complexity of the transformation and in explaining the varieties of postcommunist 
democracy. The depth and scope of postcommunist transformations may be 
uncovered, analyzed and measured while accounting for its diversity and, most of 
all, for its dynamic and erratic character, with the help of Theodore J. Lowi’s typology 
of political processes1. Having recourse to Lowi’s conceptualization has, in our view, 
several noticeable merits: (1) it states for the very beginning the multiplicity of actors 
and logics of postcommunism, thus breaking the illusion of an unified outlook of 
postcommunist political change; (2) it situates the uncertainty of postcommunism 
not only within the inner economy of each political process, but also in their mutual 
and various interactions; (3) it allows us to overcome the difficulty of dealing with 
structural distinctions such as regime vs. state or state vs. society whose delimitations 
are the very product of postcommunism rather that its premises; (4) it helps us to 
apprehend the complexity of this historical phenomenon in its inherent synchronicity 
while avoiding the trap of rigid causalities.
Going beyond the classical operational distinctions between politics and 
administration, policy-making and policy implementation, law and policies, and 
even politics and policies, and asserting that any policy involves a certain kind of 
coercion, Theodore J. Lowi’s typology orders the multiplicity of political processes 
within a fourfold conceptual matrix based on the crossing of two criteria: the subject-
matter of policies (regulation/rules or welfare/benefits) and their scope (individual 
or category/class or persons). Consequently, each political process is delimiting a 
specific ”arena of power”, defined by a particular power structure resulting from 
the typical interplay between specific actors carrying out definite endeavors. In the 
arena of constituent policies, general rules (constitutional engineering, institutional 
1 We are referring to the seminal Theodore J. LOWI, ”Four Systems of Policy, Politics, 
and Choice”, Public Administration Review, vol. 32, no. 4, 1972, pp. 298-310, to this author’s 
recent book Arenas of Power, Paradigm Publishers, Boulder & London, 2009, where the author 
thoroughly develops and exemplifies the conceptual model he proposed in the ’70s, as well as 
to the redesign of his typology in Mauro CALISE, Theodore J. LOWI, Hyperpolitics. An Interactive 
Dictionary of Political Science, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2010 (an on-line platform 
available at http://www.hyperpolitics.net/). 
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design, electoral system) addressing the most comprehensive class of individuals 
in a polity, the citizenry, are designed by political and bureaucratic elites acting 
at the top level of the political unit. Within the redistributive arena, strategies of 
immediate coercion (fiscal policies, social security policies etc.) directed to more or 
less extensive categories of citizens tailored by bureaucratic expertise are set up as 
the result of negotiations between national political actors, high civil servants and 
pressure groups. Descending to the lower layers of the polity, regulative processes 
are legitimate forms of direct coercion or legitimate violence exercised by those 
territorially deployed public agencies in charge with identifying, sanctioning and 
correcting individual behavior transgressing the established rules. Finally, distributive 
or patronage policies are processes oriented toward the grass root level of the polity 
intended to engineer various forms of social consensus by distributing divisible 
benefits through the interplay of actors and agents established or validated at the 
territorial or corporate level of society. Each arena has its own rationale as it aims to 
polish class/category behavior (constituent) or individual behavior (regulative), or 
incit class/category (redistributive) or individual (distributive) behavior. Typically, 
the interaction within arenas may be conflictive (constituent, regulative), consensual 
(constituent), collusive (distributive) or pluralistic (regulative). Moreover, the four 
typical processes analytically isolated by Lowi are accounting not only for the various 
dynamics of a political system, but also for its diverse and distinct layers, thus 
heuristically reassessing the combined exertion of the verticality and the horizontality 
of a polity1.
As distinct as they may be, these processes are intertwined in the general 
movement of a political unit. Their constant interplay can be described in different 
ways. If patterned and predictable to some extent, the overall economy of the four 
types of policies can be construed as a system or, in Max Weber terms, as a valid or 
enduring order. Within it however, the game of causal determinations contradicts 
the logic generally ascribed and/or alleged by public law or democratic theory. It 
was Lowi’s empirically grounded contention that ”policies determine politics”. That 
is, against the classical assumption according to which the political decisions taken 
in the high political spheres enjoy a logical primacy, reverberated as they would 
typically be in lower or remote parts of the polity, the highly visible and sometimes 
dramatic choices and strategies designed in the constituent arena are conditioned or 
even contradicted by, if they are not the mere result of the constant and unforeseen 
work of the other three types of political processes2.
After the Second World War, the Eastern European regimes strived to embody 
the Soviet model, i.e. to set and organize their constituent policies by emphasizing, 
simultaneously and/or successively one policy or the other. As precipitate and 
unexpected as it was, the fall of communism suddenly dismantled the patterned 
policy interplay configured and validated during the Party-state rule. However, 
not only the way out of communism was diversely experienced throughout the 
area, but also, in every particular case, the inner economy of each political process 
was differently altered by the event, engendering a diversity of postcommunisms. 
We shall ourselves limit to the Romanian case, acknowledging that a comparative 
1 Cf. Giovanni SATORI, ”What is Politics?”, Political Theory, vol. I, no. 1, 1973, pp. 5-26. 
2 See especially chapter 3, ”Parallels of Policy and Politics. The Political Theory in American 
History”, in Theodore J. LOWI, Arenas of Power, cit., pp. 65-90.
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approach to postcommunisms guided by this fourfold typology could be nothing but 
revealing. Postcommunisms may be construed as a highly unplanned and difficult 
reshaping of the interplay between the four arenas, knowing that each corresponding 
power structure was undergoing by the same move massive rearrangements. Also, 
postcommunisms could be reconstructed as a succession of critical junctures between 
the four processes. In each arena, actors are shaped and reshaped as their interaction 
is constantly and erratically redesigned. 
This analysis of the Romanian postcommunism is a sketchy one. It does not 
aim to apprehend the whole complexity of the Romanian political change. Instead, 
it focuses on the vicissitudes of the confection of a new regime, of a renewed relation 
between the citizens and the political authority1 asking for a converted rationale of 
political legitimacy while acting through institutional arrangements and sociological 
modes shaped during communism and compelled to a diffuse functional reshuffling 
from the very first moments of postcommunism.
In the Romanian 1989 collapse of communism, civil unrest, the army and the 
police changing loyalties, as well as the defection and execution of the head of the 
Party-state, Nicolae Ceauşescu, disorganized in an abrupt manner the constituent 
and the regulative arenas. It was in that setting dramatically seized by uncertainty 
that narratives of the fall of communism are beginning to be told. Theses narratives 
served then as means designed or simply endorsed by newly emerging actors within 
this devastated constituent arena aiming to acquire a political identity and a public 
profile in order to set their claim to participate in the making up of the constituent 
policies of postcommunism. The political value of those narratives was, at that time, 
largely illocutionary as these stories were, after all, the only substance those new 
groups in quest of political status were actually made of: they existed only by telling 
the tale of the civil unrest to rebellious citizens. Narratives of the fall of communism 
remained central in Romanian politics until the constituent arena acquired a 
somehow patterned configuration. For Romanian political actors, December 1989 
was a significant element as long as they lacked organizational strength, as they 
were disputing in a national setting framed by a highly centralized state, and as they 
addressed a politically mobilized public through national and state owned media 
and an institutionally integrated society within the infrastructural networks of the 
socialist state. However, the relative stabilization of the constituent arena was due to 
a lesser extent to clear and enduring choices made within its jurisdiction and more 
to the joint work of processes within and through the other arenas. In this respect, 
one way to capture the sequence of critical junctures between the various political 
processes defining postcommunism is to have a transversal and synchronic look at 
partisan politics, electoral processes, and policies of institutional redesign of the state 
architecture. In this gallery, electoral processes are playing a privileged part. This is 
not only because they are stances of visible concentrated contentiousness, but mainly 
because, considered as a process, that is as a setting in motion of various institutions 
and actors, it is one of the few loci of explicit and momentous intersection of all four 
political processes mentioned above.
1 Charles TILLY, Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Mass., 2007, pp. 1-24.
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Contentious Postcommunism: Constituent Politics
The very first years of Romanian postcommunism were a time of constituent 
politics, or, simply put, a time for giving the first answers to the basic lasswellian 
question: ”who gets what, when and how?” in the new setting shaped by the demise 
of the Communist Party and the execution of the head of the Party-State. However, in 
this case and against any expectation of the actors involved, political morphology had 
precedence over political syntax. More specifically, who was the blistering part of the 
question: who was to become the subject in the basic grammar of the new regime to 
be put up? Who was to give the operational definition of the ”democracy” to be born? 
Who was to tell the rules of the new game in order for everybody to play accordingly? 
The way this who question was then answered largely depended of the practical 
meanings of the what, and mostly of the when and how as they were then phrased. The 
history of this constituent politics may be retold in the light of those questions. 
From a technical point of view, the fall of Romanian communism was as sequence 
of civil unrest, repression and institutional collusion. It was, first of all, the expression 
of a massive civil disobedience, or the bottom-up as well as top down invalidation 
of the regulatory processes of the regime. It was also a sudden decapitation of the 
Party-State: the Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party and President 
of the Socialist Republic was executed in the last days of 1989, while the Communist 
Party itself was declared vanished, officially inexistent, in the first days of 1990. 
Instrumentally speaking, the actor responsible for those two events was the Romanian 
military and police. Politically speaking, the two gestures were commanded and 
alleged by an ad hoc and very ambiguous actor, the self-styled National Salvation 
Front (NSF), materialized spontaneously in the public life, addressing the nation 
through the voice of a handful of persons and claiming to be the political byproduct of 
the so-called ”Revolution”, a ”Revolution” playing the part of provisional constituent 
policy in times of change. 
This ”Revolution” is told by the national spokesmen of NSF while the whole 
process is still in the making. Consequently, this first narrative is exhaustive: it defines 
the past, it sets up the present and it gives a general outlook of the future to come. 
It is intended to be consensual and to support a strategy of political substitution 
and institutional endurance: the communist regime was a personal dictatorship of 
Nicolae Ceauşescu; this dictatorship was overthrown by a revolution; the revolution 
was made by the ”whole people, by the army and the police”; this revolutionary 
outburst created a ”vacuum of power” which the NSF was to completely fill up in 
order to ensure and preserve the integrity and chiefly the functional character of state 
institutions by establishing a provisional government; at the same time, the NSF was 
to set up the conditions for the future ”democratization” of the country1. Thus, in 
the mechanics of the political change, the design of the NSF was then to reshape the 
constituent arena while striving to preserve and protect the other power structures of 
the former regime.
As consensual as it was meant to be, this strategy, and the story going along 
with it, was challenged as a consequence of the radical and sudden disorganization 
1 For a detailed account of the Romanian December 1989, see Alexandra IONESCU, 
”La dernière révolution léniniste. Pensée et pratique de l’autorité révolutionnaire en Roumanie”, 
Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. VI, no. 1, 2006, pp. 25-114.
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of the Party-state regulative arena: that is the derangement of the routinized ways 
the relations between individuals and institutionalized devices of individual coercion 
uses to work throughout the former socialist system. The collision between a ravaged 
constituent politics and a dismantled regulative one impacted not only on the national 
visible politics, but also on the lower and more intimate layers of the polity. To put 
it simply, it disturbed the relationship between citizens, as individualities and as 
organized/institutionalized groups, and political authorities from both sides of the 
link. 
Spontaneously endorsing rights that were to be subsequently enacted or simply 
taking advantage of the new political opportunities, various groups disputed the 
position and the scope of the NSF, claiming to enter the constituent arena through 
this new door opened by the possibility of creating political parties. The claim 
inflected the political substitution strategy initially conceived by the NSF spokesmen 
and determined them to disclose the constituent arena to the contesting groups in 
terms and conditions the NSF itself designed. The act started a Romanian ”round 
table” which, having similar consequences in terms of legitimacy as the other eastern-
European political negotiations1, exhibited several peculiarities2. Firstly, there was no 
Romanian Communist Party to take part in as no public voice alleged its existence, 
and as the leaders of the NSF had anyhow officially declared it had vanished away. 
Secondly, the bargaining was based on a balance of power favoring the NSF. Endowed 
with a nationwide revolutionary legitimacy the latter contrasted with a large variety 
of small groups asserting various identities, but mostly unable or unwilling to retell 
coherent courter-narratives of the fall of communism.  
This unbalanced and contentious ”round table”, which lasted for three month, 
produced the first operational definition of the democracy to be born, written in the 
text of the first electoral law and eventually transcribed with minimal corrections in the 
1991 Constitution. It set its actors, its general rules as well as the scope of the regime in 
the making. The new democracy was to be an electoral democracy, expressed through 
parties running for parliamentary seats in national elections organized upon the 
principle of proportional representation, acquiring parliamentary majorities and thus 
forming the government. On the one hand, as minimal as it was, this first definition 
had then a double value: considered as a political principle, it was capable to satisfy 
everybody; considered as a political mechanism, it firstly and largely favored the 
NSF. On the other hand though, seen in retrospect, this first definition was largely 
inspired by a form of political wishful thinking. The game was set as if its actors 
would have been already or at least would have rapidly become nationwide, coherent 
and strongly articulated political parties able to invest Parliament and, by the same 
token, legitimize national elective institutions by producing all sorts of policies meant 
to generate the postcommunist welfare. Or, as hopeful as it may have been with 
regards to the would-be subjects of the postcommunist constituent politics, this first 
arrangement set the general conditions for their ulterior emergence in a way that 
largely contradicted the initial design.
1 Jon ELSTER (ed.), The Round-Table Talks. The Breakdown of Communism, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1996.
2 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă. Politică şi societate în România postcomunistă, Nemira, 
Bucureşti, 2004, available also in German, Die abwesende Republik, transl. by Larissa Schippel, 
Frank & Timme, Berlin, 2009.
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The electoral democracy of the 1990s was caught in a trap, both conceptual 
and functional. On the one hand, while they were supposed to represent citizens, to 
produce the political community as such in a visible and actual manner, parties were 
in fact producing themselves as electoral identity was the only identity they were 
able to acquire and as there was not yet a political society to be re-presented. On the 
other hand, while producing themselves electorally, parties were not really capable to 
differentiate each other and thus to became effective agents of pluralism. Much has 
been said on the elusiveness of political messages in postcommunism in general, on 
the lack of political prospects and on the diluted identity of the parties. Romanian 
postcommunism was no exception in this respect. But there was a decisive structural 
reason for this condition. Besides a certain lack of political imagination, parties were 
somehow condemned to be indistinct: firstly, they were addressing an indistinct 
society, as society at large was not readable, at least not yet, neither in political nor in 
governmental terms; on the other hand, the scope of the political messages launched 
by the parties had to be exhaustive, had to have the extent of the former socialist 
state, as Romanian society was still penetrated and animated by its regulative and 
redistributive networks. Thus, electoral democracy was confined into a conceptual 
vicious circle: it was supposed to read the political society through parties, while 
parties were meant to give society a political image of itself. In this vicious circle of the 
postcommunist constituent politics, narratives and counter-narratives of 1989 served 
as a temporary way out.
Romanian postcommunism started with a minimal definition of what a political 
party was supposed to be: any group of 251 citizens, provided that it had some 
kind of founding chart, some form of political program and, most of all, the will 
to participate in the electoral competition1. However, in contrast with this political 
comprehensiveness, the electoral law issued by the so called Provisional Council for 
National Unity was constraining in a different manner. Certainly, in its principle – 
proportional representation with no threshold – it was highly permissive and entirely 
coherent with the party definition already established. But the political and electoral 
mechanism imagined at that time established a pattern of strategic interactions 
between the more or less disorganized power structures of each arena.
This initial electoral law2 set in motion two significant dynamics. First, it drew 
the map of constituencies following the lines of the administrative layout designed at 
the end of the 1960s and systematically reconfirmed from then on. Second, it designed 
a configuration of top-down and bottom-up institutional equilibria which will act as 
a general layout for the organizational make-up of Romanian parties. The counties, 
functional hinges between the central and local politics and policies and frameworks 
of both regulative and redistributive processes designed and practiced during 
communism, were thus to become parliamentary constituencies. Within each county, 
the electoral process was to be organized in precincts tailored by the county authorities 
and based on electoral lists established by mayors chosen by the central government3. 
On the other hand, parties were invited to submit lists of candidates to the county 
electoral offices bearing the counter-signature of the party’s national leadership. This 
1 As set by one of the NSF’s first decrees, December 31, 1989. 
2 The first electoral law was enacted by the Provisional Council of National Unity, composed 
of representatives of the NSF and of parties constituted in January-February 1990 following an 
algorithm largely favoring the latter.
3 Until 1992, the mayors of Romanian localities were appointed by the Government.
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setting engendered several consequences. Firstly, it suddenly endowed the locus of 
distributive and regulative processes shaped during communism, the county, with an 
electoral added value. Secondly, it offered to the party leaderships quickly improvised 
in the aftermath of the fall of communism instruments to control or at list tame the 
recruitment of the candidates expected to run in the newly established constituencies. 
Thirdly, it strongly discriminated between competitors by opening or closing to them 
the access to the other arenas of power.
The state architecture inherited from the Communist regime exhibited at least 
three structural characteristics which were to become highly pertinent from an 
electoral and party-building point of view. First, it was all-encompassing, integrating 
in control or productive units all the active Romanian population. Secondly, it was 
a highly centralized architecture, were communes, townships and counties were 
ordered within a net of hierarchical subordinations to the central government. 
Thirdly, it was intensely heteronymous: Romanian communism had produced a 
structurally unified Party-state by building simultaneously the intertwined party and 
state apparata. Moreover, following the guiding principles of institutional endurance 
set in the first moments of the ”Revolution”, this centralized logic was reinforced by 
the provisional authorities who willingly endorsed the power to nominate or dismiss 
county or local officeholders, delaying by the same token the organization of local 
and county elections.
Unsurprisingly, the first 1990 general elections confirmed the victory of the NSF 
while confining the other would-be parties in a state of second-rate political actors. 
Typically, two ways for relating the electoral competitors to the territorial deployed 
Romanian society were available to the parties in the making: media, especially 
state owned media, and state architecture. While only the NSF parliamentary and 
governmental representatives were able to engage in distributive processes by 
controlling the all-encompassing state architecture, its competitors were somehow 
confined to organize their social support and electoral appeal within the limits of the 
turbulent regulative arena. 
It is in this setting that a counter-narrative of the fall of communism was elaborated 
and disseminated by various contending groups. Endorsed and unified by parties 
opposed to the NSF, it served to establish their claim to embody an ”anticommunist” 
identity. It has been already and pertinently observed that this ”anticommunist” 
identity was essentially postcommunist1 as not only it took some time for it to be 
articulated in a coherent political statement but also relied on postcommunist public 
gestures and attitudes. Like the first narrative, it appraised the past, it designed 
the present and it drew a general outlook of the future: the fallen regime was not 
embodied in the person of Nicolae Ceauşescu, but in the Communist Party apparatus; 
the apparatus succeeded in surviving the demise of the Party and ”confiscated” the 
”Revolution”; so the ”revolution” has to continue peacefully in order to put an end to 
communism by chasing the former Communist Party elite out of the political realm. 
Surprisingly enough, at the very moment when the national political conflict 
seemed to acquire clarity through the confrontation of the two grand narratives of 
December 1989, that is in first half of the 1990s, political processes were to become 
more and more complicated and unpredictable in their entrenchment at other levels 
of the political setting.  
1 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă, cit., pp. 107-121.
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Socializing the State: Regulative Postcommunist Processes
Crafting public identities was only one of the imperatives of party building 
strategies. Assembling party organization was another. If identity was framed in a 
national site by parties’ spokesmen engaged in conflictive arguments suggesting 
Homeric confrontations, organizational-building worked at lower levels of the 
political unit as, all in all, votes were gathered on the ground, in the counties and in 
the polling stations. 
Civil disobedience in various forms characterized the first years of Romanian 
postcommunism. Certainly, their most visible and aggregated forms were public 
protest, usually with a political aim. Most public rallies of the 1990s were one way 
or the other inserted in the national ”anticommunist” versus ”neo-communist” 
debate, participating in the process of party identity building. However, another 
form of disobedience emerged rapidly in Romanian postcommunism: massive, tacit, 
but not less pertinent with regards to constituent and especially to redistributive 
processes. At the local and intermediate levels of the polity, individuals and 
groups were spontaneously able to escape the constraints of the regulative policies 
designed by the former regime. The entropy of the regulative arena of Romanian 
postcommunism increased suddenly, while its structure became highly pluralistic, 
annihilating the capacity of state institutions to polish actual behaviors of individuals 
and groups in a coherent manner. The capacity of individuals, be them unruly citizens 
or future entrepreneurs, to interpret freely and on the spot rules enacted hastily by 
national officials met the incapacity or unwillingness of regulative public agencies 
of any sort (courts, police, agencies of fiscal or economic control etc.) to tame this 
overall randomness. Individual practical creativeness, dramatic inadequacy of 
the institutional means of control, collusive practices of regulative officeholders of 
any sort, usually expressed through the emergence of black market or the spread 
of corruption, described together the spontaneous dynamic reconfiguration of the 
regulative arena. 
The phenomenon may be construed in various ways. From a bottom-up 
perspective, it may be understood as a powerful and intense socialization of state 
institutions on the ground, largely contradicting the centralized logic of the state 
architecture managed from above. From a top-down perspective, it meant the 
outburst of ungovernability1, as abrupt social blindness of state agencies was its 
immediate corollary, and, therefore, the dramatic invalidation of the rationale of all 
redistributive policies of the former regime. In other words, national postcommunist 
political leaders were striving to save the integrity of the state, while its very means 
and devices of government were rapidly turning inadequate with respect to a society 
governmentally illegible, if not even unreachable. The very rationale of governmental 
routines validated during socialism was suddenly broken.
Indeed, the general institutional architecture of the Romanian state remained 
highly centralized. However, by the end of 1991 and in the horizon of future local 
1 Richard ROSE, Governing the Ungouvernability. A Skeptical Inquiry, Studies in Public Policy, 
7, Center for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, no. 1, 1977. Distinct of 
the notion of legitimacy which answers the question why, the notion of ungovernability addresses 
the modal question of the ways and means of government, interrogating its capacity and its 
efficacy. Silent during the communist regime, this question started to be loudly expressed from 
the very first moments of postcommunism. 
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elections, local and county instances of state administration have already become 
would-be active units within the distributive arena, endowed with the legal capacity 
and the attribution of managing public services and the patrimony within their 
jurisdiction as a result of the administrative redesign set in motion from 1991 on1. As 
in the general elections law, local units (townships, communes) acquired the charge of 
laying the polling stations and drawing electoral list, under the supervision of county 
prefects. However, with respect to party-building organizational strategies, probably 
the most significant disposition of the local electoral regime concerned the capacity of 
party leaders at the county level to control the candidates. Thus, while the territorial 
deployed state architecture was experiencing a process of socialization from below, 
party organizations in the making were undergoing a similar process, thus balancing 
the ability of party leaders to set up clear partisan strategies and forcing them to 
compose with diverse local realities in order to confirm their electoral appeal.  
The first 1992 local elections were already revealing from this point of view. 
Certainly, taking advantage of the minimal legal definition of political parties 
established at the beginning of postcommunism, the gallery of political parties 
addressing the whole nation through the media became more and more populous, 
as, under the vague umbrella of the two grand narratives of the fall of communism, 
various groups were emerging, melting up or splitting down. However, even if the NSF, 
itself affected at a national level by inner conflicts, preserved its electoral dominance, 
elective positions at local and county levels were more equitably distributed between 
party labels, suggesting a disconnection between the elective layers of the regime, 
interpreted at that time as a general tendency of the body politic to massively switch 
electoral preferences. 
It is in this general framework defined by electoral volatility, organizational 
instability, and unsteady balance between party in central office and party on the 
ground that a new operational definition of Romanian democracy was issued in 1995 
by the Parliament elected in 1992 and quite compound in its partisan composition. 
This second definition may be interpreted as a corrective constituent policy. Certainly, 
considered from a strategic point of view, it was meant to confine the access to the 
elective institutions. However, in a constituent perspective, it may be seen as an 
attempt of the political elite at the national level to remediate to the failings of the 
constitutional design established in 1991. As previously stated, the parliamentary logic 
of the regime was resting on the presupposition explicitly alleged by its promoters that 
Romanian postcommunist politics was to be organized around massive parties able to 
build clear governmental majorities. Or, if this postulation had been suggested by the 
first 1990 elections, the next ballot had already forced the party leaders to engage in 
more or less stable coalition strategies thus blurring the functional arrangement of the 
political regime and facilitating the access to governmental positions and benefits to a 
variety of political actors. Therefore, this mid-1990s constituent policy acted through 
two instruments: through the establishment of electoral thresholds limiting the access 
to the parliamentary, county and local seats, on the one hand; through a renewed and 
more restrictive legal definition of parties, on the other hand. 
1 The process of redesigning the administrative framework of the Romanian state started 
in 1990-1991. As shy as the will of decentralization may have been at the beginning, the process 
enabled actors playing at various institutional levels of the state architecture with a more and 
more autonomous capacity of distributing public resources.  
238
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. X • no. 2 • 2010
ALEXANDRA IONESCU
In the terms of the 1996 law on parties, Romanian democracy would have ceased 
to be an electoral democracy in order to become a party democracy. The legal portrait 
of the Romanian party was drawn accordingly. Parties were defined as legal persons 
of public law accomplishing a constitutional mission, they were required to have a 
specific and rather massive number of founding members, to prove their territorial 
coverage by recruiting members and building local organizations in counties, they 
were compelled to participate systematically into national elections and, moreover, 
they imperatively had to reproduce the administrative architecture of the state in 
their inner organizational structure. This legal definition was destined to endure as 
its requirements were incessantly strengthen from then on and it was accompanied 
by provisions governing the public financing of political parties1. However, its 
consequences were not entirely those desired or expected.
The End of Contentious Politics 
and the Triumph of Distributive Policies
The 1996 elections were considered as the triumph of anti-communist parties. 
Allied in a heteronymous coalition, various political parties having engineered their 
public identity by endorsing the ”anticommunist” narrative of the fall of communism 
had reason of the parties alleging to the alternative story. However, beneath if not 
against this ideological fracture in the history of Romanian postcommunism other 
political processes invalidated the redistributive ethical agenda of the so-called 
anticommunist coalition. Those coterminous processes were informing the political 
change, located as they were in the distributive and redistributive arenas. Together, 
they were somehow responsible for maintaining the confrontation between political 
parties at a national level. 
On the one hand, under the top-down weight of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the bottom-up pressure exercised by groups within the regulative 
arena, restructuring planned economy and undoing the grand social policies of the 
communist regime became a huge distributive process whose benefits were shared 
out by all parties having undertaken a governmental responsibility. This distributive 
process typical of the 1990s worked through actors located in the higher levels of 
government administration and corporate agents in the making mainly but not 
exclusively within the scope of the infrastructural network of the former socialist 
state. The objects of the distributive process were various: estates, goods, acquisitions, 
participations in public companies to be privatized, business opportunities of all 
sorts. The bottom-up socialization of the state administration through the regulative 
arena joined the top-down dismantlement of state economy. Again, the phenomenon 
may be described in various ways. From a classical political theory point of view, the 
process slowly engendered a newly born unruly civil society, or a space of satisfaction 
of needs outside explicit government intervention or reach. From a political sociology 
1 From an electoral legislation viewpoint, the period of 1990-1996 proved to be the more 
stable one in Romanian postcommunism. Afterwards, modifying, adding or correcting 
the legislation dealing with parties (organization and financing) and elections (thresholds, 
eligibility, designing constituencies, organizing the electoral process as such) became one of the 
main businesses of Romanian governments.
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stance, it may be seen as a collusive disjunction between state and society. Political 
parties were simultaneously authors, beneficiaries and byproducts of this process, as 
they were invited to circumstantially connect the territorial-electoral volatility of the 
Romanian body politic with the corporate-functional spontaneous dynamism of the 
Romanian society.
On the other hand, both regulative and distributive processes typical for 
postcommunism dramatically obstructed the redistributive policies designed under 
communism. Romanian society became illegible not only in terms of effective 
individual behaviors, but also in terms of categories to be inserted in welfare policies. 
Government officials stretched the welfare/integrative instruments coined during the 
former regime (e.g. retirement allowances, health insurances, educational policies), 
crafted new ones (e.g. taxation, unemployment policies) striving to cover the social 
opacity either in the name of social-ethical imperatives – the end of the communist 
working class, the rise of entrepreneurs –, or through distributive policies addressing 
specific social categories considered electorally beneficial (peasants, retired persons, 
students, mothers etc.). One should also note that, beside the lack of an operative 
knowledge of the dynamics of the Romanian society during postcommunism, the 
governmental imagination or will of Romanian governments was drastically limited 
and controlled by the pressure put first by the IMF and the World Bank agreements 
and, later, by the various forms of conditionality implied by the process of European 
integration. 
The interaction between the constituent processes of the mid-1990s and the 
distributive processes of the first postcommunist decade had at least three major 
consequences on Romanian political parties. Firstly, the rigid legal definition set up 
in 1996 failed to transform Romanian parties in patterned forms of membership and 
collective action at a national level. The bottom-up and top-down processes affecting 
state architecture through the regulative and distributive arenas and by the same token 
party building strategies rendered party headquarters unable to control neither their 
organizational elements on the ground, nor their representatives in public office1. If the 
restrictive legal definition of parties somehow restrained the secessionist tendencies 
within existent parties, it did not reduce the inner entropy of party organizations, nor 
enforce the distinctions between Romanian parties. On the contrary, their organizational 
weakness and congenital heteronomy just expressed itself in different ways. On the 
one hand, through the migration of elected representatives from one party to another 
following the electoral forecast of the moment, reshaping thus parliamentary or local 
councils majorities during the legislative term. Just before the 2000 elections, the party 
leading the so-called “anticommunist” coalition having won the 1996 elections lost 
its support in Parliament being deserted by its own representatives for parties with 
more electoral appeal. Far from being a circumstantial event, the process affected 
Romanian parties ever since, transgressing every single ideological distinction line 
between political actors. On the other hand, this partisan interpenetration took also 
a more structured form as not only individuals but local party organizations were in 
the habit of changing loyalties from one election to another. 
1 For an analytical view on the inner economy of parties see Richard KATZ, Peter MAIR, 
How Parties Organize. Change and Adaptation in Parties Organizations in Western Democracies, Sage 
Publications, London, 1994.
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Secondly, this organizational confusion between Romanian parties strongly 
affected their identity strategies. On the one hand, party headquarters were not able 
anymore to defend neither ideological identities, nor irreducible narratives of the fall 
of communism for party structures having contradicted their irreducible character. 
”The communist past has become politically irrelevant” notoriously claimed a 
liberal Romanian politician in the eve of the 2000 elections, calling for an ideological 
realignment of Romanian parties. However, the realignment proved to be impossible. 
Because, on the other hand, the enhanced social illegibility of Romanian society 
engendered by the postcommunist regulative and distributive processes rendered 
Romanian parties unable to offer the electorate alternatives of redistributive policies 
capable to replace the distinctions drew upon the conflictive narratives of the fall 
of communism. Under the permissive umbrella of European integration, Romanian 
parties became more and more indistinct.
Thirdly, within the inner economy of this organizational fragility of Romanian 
parties, the balance between party in central office and party on the ground changed 
dramatically. The regulative instrument coined in 2006 in order to penalize those 
elected local officials who would have been tempted to change their partisan 
affiliation after elections has to be considered in the light of the process of political 
emancipation of local party structures affecting all Romanian parties. This political 
emancipation worked through different channels. On the one hand, it was expressed 
through the increased disjunction between local and national coalition strategies 
between parties. From the 1992 elections on, without necessarily contradicting 
national results, local elections produced very diverse political configurations in the 
counties and local councils throughout the country. As local levels became more and 
more significant units in the distributive arena, especially through their capacity to 
grant construction licenses or manage public commodities distribution, this electoral 
diversity engendered, especially after 2000, a variety of local political majorities 
resting on all possible combinations between parties often against the governmental 
alignments at national level1. On the other hand, as a result of the national distributive 
policies of the 1990, the juncture between parties and Romanian society considered on 
a corporate-functional axis, descended from governmental levels towards the lower 
levels of the polity. County party organizations, in their capacity of gathering votes 
and supplying financial resources for parties, became more and more significant in 
determining the choices of partisan leadership. From 2001 on, all significant Romanian 
parties having coped with the postcommunist constituent criteria experienced more 
or less dramatic changes in their leadership due to political equilibria set at local and 
intermediate levels of their organizations and visibly or contentiously expressed in 
party congresses2.
1 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele şi sistemul politic din România, Nemira, 
Bucureşti, 2008.
2 The first party to experience this turmoil was the Democratic Party in 2001, followed 
by the Social Democratic Party in 2005, both direct descendents of the NSF. Afterwards, all 
Romanian parties were affected by more and more conflictive and unstable relationships 
between their local and national levels.
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A De-nationalization of Romanian Politics?
The integrated result of all those processes was a de-nationalization of Romanian 
politics. Under the joint pressure of European integration and accession, successive 
Romanian governments were forced to engage in regulative – redesigning the judicial 
system, reforming or inventing control agencies – and redistributive policies – 
managing social cohesion. In order to do so, in conditions of enduring social illegibility, 
they had to appeal to public and partisan power structures already engaged as actors 
or resources in the distributive arena. 
In 2008, the legal framework of national elections changed significantly. While 
preserving an overall proportional logic, the electoral law did two major turnovers. 
First, it personalized the voter’s choice by dividing the counties into single-members 
districts designed this time by the government. Second, and most importantly, it 
withdrew from party central offices the capacity to nominate or control the candidates 
for Parliament while assigning it to county party organizations. The result of this 
shift was consistent with the processes mentioned above. On the one hand, political 
competitiveness diminished significantly as no electoral district staged direct contest 
between prominent party leaders. On the other hand, the electoral competition lost 
any national significance. Confined within their counties and districts, local parties 
collided and colluded on a convenient distribution of their mandates, refraining from 
elaborating national grand narratives of the past or future.
    
